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When "Contracting Around" the Law
Will Not Work: The Potential
Inability to Expressly Prohibit
Punitive Damages in Arbitration
Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P. C.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the availability of all appropriate remedies is an important part of judi-
cial litigation, the attempt to identify and limit those remedies is an issue in an
arbitration proceeding. After the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., it seemed clear that parties would
be allowed to seek punitive damages if an agreement did not expressly prohibit
2such damages. Even so, parties continue to falter in writing agreements meant to
contain the proper language that will succeed in limiting the availability of certain
remedies. This is due to the continued confusion over how to limit the application
of choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements, and to the policy argument
that, even if parties can put limitations on liability, perhaps such limitations are
not fair when tortious and grievous acts have been committed.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
In April 2000, Plaintiffs-Appellants Stanley and Patricia Starks (the Starks)
filed for bankruptcy protection after borrowing money against their home and
securing the loan with a mortgage to fund a failing business.3 At the time, their
note was owned by EMC Mortgage Corporation (EMC), a debt collector subject
to the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) . The Starks
moved from their home, but retained legal title and did not abandon it.5 EMC
motioned to lift the automatic stay on the Starks' home in June 2000, and foreclo-
sure proceedings began. 6 The Starks' attorney, Roy True, informed Scott Green-
berg of Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C. that his representation of the
Starks was not limited to bankruptcy Proceedings, and that Greenberg, and EMC,
should not contact the Starks directly.
After EMC repeatedly attempted direct contact with the Starks between Oc-
tober 2000 and March 2001, the Starks filed suit in the United States District
1. 381 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2004).
2. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).
3. Stark, 381 F.3d at 797.
4. Id. The note was sold to EMC by the Starks' original lender around April 2000, just prior to
these proceedings. Id. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2004).
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Court for the Western District of Missouri against EMC and its attorneys in April
2001, under the FDCPA.8 The district court ordered the parties to arbitration, as
mandated in the parties' loan agreement.9 Even while the claim was pending in
arbitration, an EMC agent forcibly entered the Starks' home, called Mrs. Stark,
and wrote to the Starks directly.' These actions led to an amended complaint
wherein the Starks alleged intentional torts by EMC and asked for punitive dam-
ages."1 EMC opposed the motion to amend, maintaining that their arbitration
agreement expressly excluded punitive damages, while the Starks argued that such
a limitation was unconscionable and unenforceable. 12  Discerning the contract
language as ambiguous,' 3 the arbitrator construed the language against EMC,
finding that punitive damages were not prohibited as a matter of law, and awarded
actual damages totaling around $34,000, and punitive damages of $6,000,000.14
EMC moved to vacate the punitive damage award, continuing to claim that
punitive damages were expressly prohibited in their agreement. 15  The district
court sustained the challenge and vacated the punitive damage award, finding that
the agreement was not ambiguous, and thus, did not require any interpretation by
the arbitrator that would allow for a punitive damage award.
16
The Starks appealed the vacatur to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, arguing that the arbitrator had the authority to construe the con-
tract, and it was not irrational to have concluded that punitive damages were al-
lowed. 17 Among other points,' 8 EMC argued that the finding of an ambiguity was
irrational because the language of the agreement clearly prohibited punitive dam-
ages, and that the award was "excessive and made in manifest disregard of the
law."'19 Reversing the district court's decision to vacate the punitive damage
8. Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 2004).
9. Id. The parties did not dispute the district court's order to compel arbitration.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The relevant contract provision granted the arbitrator "all powers provided by law," and
subsequently denied the power to award "punitive ... damages ... as to which borrower and lender
expressly waive any right to claim to the fullest extent permitted by law." Id. at 797-98.
13. Id. The arbitrator based the holding of ambiguity on the fact that the agreement between the
Starks and EMC purported, in three sections, to allow the Starks "to seek all damages allowed by law,"
and then took away their ability to do so in a later section of the agreement. Id. at 798. The arbitrator
stated this practice was "the keystone of an ambiguous contract," and should be construed in favor of
the Starks. Id. at 798.
14. Id. The award of $6,000,000 was based on 1% of EMC's shareholder equity. Id. at 798 n.l.
Although 1% would have actually been $60,000,000, the arbitrator later rectified his mistake by stating
his intent was to award only $6,000,000. Id. Therefore, the Starks were awarded one-tenth of one
percent of shareholder equity. Id.
15. Id. at 798.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) allows a district court to vacate an arbitration award
under very limited circumstances, including fraud or corruption, evidence of partiality, arbitrator
misconduct, or an arbitrator's misuse of power. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2004).
18. EMC argued two additional points in its response. First, they argued that the district court prop-
erly vacated the award under § 10 of the FAA "because the arbitrator exceeded his powers by modify-
ing [an] unambiguous [contract]." Stark, 381 F.3d at 799. Secondly, the award was properly modified
under § 11 of the FAA, because the arbitrator made a decision on punitive damages, an issue which
was not presented for assessment. Id. The court disregarded this second argument because the issue of
punitive damages clearly was given to the arbitrator, leaving § 10 as the only appropriate avenue to
remedy an excessive award. Id. at 800 n.2.
19. Id. at 800.
[Vol. I
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award, the Eighth Circuit found that, when the applicable law governing the arbi-
tration agreement does not permit a waiver of punitive damages, an agreement
that purports to waive or limit future liability will not be ruled ambiguous and
punitive damages are expressly permitted.2 °
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Practitioners often seek arbitration as a forum for their clients, desiring it as a
more expeditious means to resolve the matter at hand, as well as a forum that will
not expose the client to excessive risks. 21 Because punitive damages are often
awarded as a form of "punishment," in order to deter future behavior, and for the
"public benefit," parties may believe that the more private system of arbitration
will not open them up to the risk of having to pay punitive damages.22 However,
parties often risk having a punitive damages award assessed against them, whether
in front of a judge, jury, or arbitrator. Due to the language of the parties' contract,
and the applicable law, punitive damages can, and often are, awarded in arbitra-
tion.
Generally, a court's review of a final arbitration award, including any puni-
tive damage award given by the arbitrator, is quite narrow. 23 If the arbitrator was
"arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority," even a serious error will not result in a reversal.24 The reviewing court
will not consider the merits, no matter if the parties contend that the arbitrator
based his or her decision on a factual error or misinterpreted the contract. Be-
yond the few grounds for vacatur provided by the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),26 an award will be overturned only where "it is completely irrational or
evidences a manifest disregard for the law.",27 When an award includes punitive
damages, that award is subject to the same standard of review, and the same con-
28siderable deference, as the arbitrator's general decision.
20. Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2004). Citing the
plain language of the agreement, the court stated that a waiver of damages could only be made "to the
fullest extent of the law." Id. This meant that there was only a limited waiver of damages that de-
pended solely on the applicable state law; only if the state in question permitted a waiver could puni-
tive damages be waived. Id. The court found it was plain that only Missouri law applied to the issue
of the waiver. Id. at 800-01. In addition, the court found that, in Missouri, EMC could not "exonerate
itself from liability for the intentional torts committed against the Starks by procuring the damages
waiver." Id. at 800.
21. Barry Richard, Corporate Litigation: Arbitration Clause Risks, THE NAT'L L. J., June 14, 2004,
at http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2004/richardb04b.pdf
22. Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Arbitrator's Power to Award Punitive Damages, 83 A.L.R.3d
1037 (2004). See also Richard, supra note 21, at 15 (stating that an attorney's belief that arbitration
could "result in lower awards than a trial makes no sense").
23. Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Communication Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir.
2002).
24. Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
25. Id.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2004). The FAA allows a district court to vacate an arbitration award under
very limited circumstances, including fraud or corruption, evidence of partiality, arbitrator misconduct,
or an arbitrator's misuse of power. Id.
27. Kiernan v. Pipar Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 594 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d
883, 885 (8th Cir. 1993)).
28. See Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793,798-99 (8th Cir. 2004).
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There are at least three splits in the law regarding the courts' deference to ar-
bitrators in upholding or vacating awards that contain punitive damages. 29 The
first line of cases hold that, as a matter of policy, arbitrators have no power to
award punitive damages. 30 This is known as the Garrity rule, and, while still in
force in some state courts, has been mostly abandoned at the federal level. 3' The
second line of cases have held that arbitrators have the power to award punitive
damages, but only when there is an express provision in the contract or arbitration
agreement allowing such "exemplary relief," or punitive relief.32 Courts applying
this principle will not construe broad language that provides for "all disputes" to
be arbitrated in order to encompass a claim for punitive damages; rather, "exem-
plary relief' must be explicitly included in the arbitration agreement.3 3 The third
line of cases holds that punitive damages can be awarded unless it is expressly
prohibited in the arbitration agreement, acting under the presumption that arbitra-
tors can award exemplary relief unless taken away.
34
Where the second and third views most clearly diverge is in interpreting an
agreement where federal and state law appear to conflict.35 Any agreement argua-
bly involving interstate commerce is governed by the FAA, but state law can con-
trol portions of the agreement if it contains a choice-of-law clause. 36 When the
arbitration clause is broad enough to permit exemplary damages under federal
law, but a choice-of-law clause grants authority to the state law, and the state pro-
hibits or limits parties' ability to waive certain exemplary relief, the conflict is
especially evident.
37
A. The Garrity Rule
The Garrity rule provides that arbitrators do not have the authority to assess
punitive damages, regardless of what the language of the contract purports to pro-
vide, because only the state through the courts has the authority to assess punitive
damages. Demonstrated first in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,38 that policy became law in
New York after their highest state court removed any power from an arbitrator to
award punitive damages, even if the parties had agreed the arbitrator could award
such damages. 39 The court in Garrity made two findings, which continue to hold
29. John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitrations in the
Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 59, 68 (1997).
30. Id.
31. Jessica Jia Fei, Awards of Punitive Damages, Jones Day, 2003 Stockholm Arbitration Report 2,
at 21-22 (2003), available at http://wwwI.jonesday.com/FILES/tbls3 lPublications/FileUploadl37/
1223/JiaFeiPunitiveDamages.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) (discussing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 40
N.Y.2d 354 (N.Y. 1976) wherein the New York court vacated the punitive damages award because
punitive damages can only be awarded by the state in a judicial forum in New York).
32. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 69.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 69-70.
35. Id. at 70-71.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 71.
38. 40 N.Y.2d 354 (N.Y. 1976).
39. Brett Alan Barfield & Judith Korchin, Punitive Damages and Summary Disposition in the Re-
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sway in some jurisdictions as the Garrity rule. 40 The court reasoned that punitive
damages are a punishment and strong public policy gives exclusive authority to
the state through its courts to define when such "socially exemplary remed[ies] are
appropriate," and that little judicial review given to arbitration awards would
make punitive awards "both unpredictable and uncontrollable.",4 In addition,
arbitration awards are generally unpublished, so the court noted that any deterrent
effect of a large punitive award, which is often a goal in giving such awards,
42would go unnoticed.
Eight years after Garrity, in Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima In-
ternational, the parties did not authorize or deny the arbitrator the power to award
punitive damages in their agreement, so the district court interpreted that silence
as authority to award punitive damages under the FAA.43 In direct contrast to
Garrity, the federal court in Willoughby held that public policy favors arbitration
in resolving disputes, and an arbitrator is more likely than the courts to be versed
in the particular issue at hand, and therefore more able to award appropriate reme-
dies. 44 The court also theorized that a party's option to waive punitive damages
could "encourage grossly unjustified conduct in certain cases by making it more
economically feasible" to engage in tortious conduct, knowing liability will not
attach.45 Many state courts followed Willoughby, ignoring the precedent set by
the New York court in Garrity, and held that arbitrators do have the authority to
award punitive damages without being expressly given such authority.46 How-
ever, Willoughby and cases following it did not overrule Garrity in the state
courts, and the Garrity rule still holds influence in arbitrations where only state
arbitration law applies, and the state law allows waiver of certain remedies.
B. Express Provision Allowing Punitive Damages
Some courts have held that punitive damages can be awarded only with an
express provision giving the arbitrator the power to do so, 47 reasoning that puni-
tive damages are an extraordinary remedy, and broad language should not be con-
clusive to imply that parties intend to provide for punitive damages.48 However,
because intent of the parties to decide their own outcome is important, these courts
will give effect to provisions that expressly award punitive damages should a dis-
pute arise.49
A typical example of a case falling into this view is one where the agreement
authorizes the arbitrator to award general fines, penalties, or damages. In a 1986
Eighth Circuit case,5 ° the parties' agreement stated that, upon violation, the claim
40. Id. See also Gotanda, supra note 29, at 69 n.50.
41. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359 (N.Y. 1976).
42. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 69 n.50.
43. 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 363.
45. Id.
46. See Barfield & Korchin, supra note 39, at 2 n.13.
47. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 69.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers, Local 34 v. Gen. Pipe Covering, 792
F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1986).
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would be arbitrated by the Trade Board, which would have the authority to "im-
pose fines or other penalties.' The Eighth Circuit confirmed the arbitrator's
award, even though the court had to interpret the arbitration language to discern
that punitive damages were expressly allowed, and stated that "punitive arbitration
awards are generally disfavored. 52
C. Punitive Damages Favored in the Face of Ambiguity
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflicting
interpretations among the federal circuits and the states in enforcing arbitration
agreements by developing a third view of the arbitrator's power to award punitive
damages in the process. 53 The courts of appeals were split on "whether 'a contrac-
tual choice-of-law provision may preclude an arbitral award of punitive damages
that otherwise would be proper."' The issue in Mastrobuono stemmed from a
securities arbitration claim, where the customers of Shearson, a brokerage firm,
brought a claim against the firm for "mishandling their account., 55 Two clauses
from their arbitration agreement were relevant: (1) a generic choice-of-law clause
stating the agreement was to be governed by New York state law; and (2) a clause
stating that any "disputes between the parties were to be resolved through arbitra-
tion in accordance with" federal provisions.56 After the arbitration, defendant
Shearson paid the compensatory damages ordered by the arbitrator, but sought to
vacate the punitive damage award.57 The district court granted the motion to va-
cate, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both courts used Garrity to find the New
York choice-of-law provision was controlling, and that the power to award puni-
tive damages was reserved exclusively for the courts.58
51. Id. at 100.
52. Id.
53. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 71 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52 (1995)).
54. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55 (1995). Compare Barbier v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2nd Cir. 1991) (vacating the award because arbitrators
abused their discretion in awarding punitive damages because both parties intended state law to apply,
which prohibited the award), and Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984)
(favoring separation of the claims so that those claims the parties agreed to arbitrate would be arbi-
trated), with Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386-1388 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to vacate an arbitral award that included
punitive damages when it was shown an expert witness had fraudulent credentials), Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Bus. Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that commercial arbitrators have the
power and authority to award punitive damages under a general contractual arbitration clause where
parties did not specifically exempt punitive damages), and Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993)
(finding that the FAA applied to the agreement, federal substantive law allows punitive damages, and
arbitrators were permitted to award punitive damages under the plain meaning of the contract lan-
guage).
55. Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB.
1, 14 (2004).
56. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 71. Under the agreement, the parties' dispute could be resolved
under the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), or the American Stock Exchange, Inc. (AMEX). Id. The court ordered the arbitra-
tion procedure of the NASD would be used, which is not relevant to the holding, except that the NASD
is federal law and conflicts with the agreement's clause that New York law would govern. Id.
57. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 54.
58. Id. at 54-55.
[Vol. I
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In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that neither clause in-
tended to exclude punitive damages, although neither explicitly included punitive
damages as an option for the arbitrator.59 If anything, the parties left their intent
regarding punitive damages ambiguous, leaving it open for the court to construe
the choice-of-law clause narrowly and applying it only to substantive principles of
New York law. The Court's decision gave deference to both state and federal
law, furthered the policy that discrepancies should favor arbitration and a broad
range of remedies, and followed the "well-settled principle" to resolve ambiguities
against the drafter of the document. 6' In addition to using ambiguity in favor of
the Mastrobuonos, the Court did not want to punish them for their apparent igno-
rance of New York's "bifurcated approach" to punitive damages, where a party to
an agreement governed solely by New York common law and policy would
clearly be giving up a substantive right to punitive damages.62
In deciding the case, the Court had to distinguish its earlier decision in Volt
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.63
Volt involved a construction contract where all disputes would be arbitrated, and
the contract itself was to be governed by the place of the incident; in this case,
California law applied. 64 However, the choice-of-law was not clear, and a conflict
arose as to whether one party could seek to stay arbitration, pending related litiga-
tion in a state court.65 Ending up in the United States Supreme Court, the case
was resolved in favor of the California provisions allowing one party to seek a
stay of the arbitration proceedings. 66 The Court held that if "parties have agreed
to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms
of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA., 67 Therefore, the
choice-of-law clause in the agreement incorporated procedural aspects of state
68law. Resolving its decision in Volt with its decision in Mastrobuono, the Courtreasoned that Mastrobuono was reviewing the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of a
59. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 73.
60. Id. at 73-74. The Supreme Court did not consider the state's arbitration law and policy as "sub-
stantive." See also Jia Fei, supra note 31, at 25 (discussing that "the power to award punitive damages
is a power derived from procedural law"). Garrity remains the New York procedural law; arbitration
agreements governed by state law will prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive damages as a proce-
dural matter. Id. Additionally, state substantive law will still be used in any case as justification for
the grant of punitive damages if a choice-of-law clause is used. Id.
61. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 74.
62. Id. See also Lisa Mellas, New York Update-Arbitration Agreements May Not Protect You
From Punitive Damages, White & Williams L.L.P., FINDLAw FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS, available
at http://library.lp.findlaw.com (2000) (last visited Oct. 9, 2004) (discussing that acknowledgement of
the Garrity or Mastrobuono holdings in a contract can aid parties in avoiding the effect of those hold-
ings). In that the Supreme Court was swayed in Mastrobuono, because the parties likely did not know
of Garrity, Mellas theorizes that "contractual clarity" may aid a party in avoiding the effect of Mastro-
buono. id. In support of this theory, Mellas cites Lian v. First Asset Management, 710 N.Y.S.2d 52
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000), wherein the court found that failure to acknowledge Mastrobuono in the arbi-
tration agreement "rendered unenforceable an express waiver of punitive damages." Id.
63. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
64. Gross, supra note 55, at 13.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989)).
68. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (Thomas, C., dissenting).
20051
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contract, while Volt was a review of a state court's interpretation of the parties'
contract under that state's rules of contract.
69
D. Effect of Mastrobuono
While the majority in Mastrobuono purported to resolve that federal law
would govern as to punitive damages due to the procedural nature of the issue, in
his dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that the issue was still wide open.70 Tho-
mas wrote that Volt, where state law was not preempted by the FAA, and Mastro-
buono, where the FAA preempted state law, were not distinguishable simply on
the grounds of procedural posture.71 He contended that Mastrobuono and Volt had
choice-of-law clauses that were "functionally equivalent" and should have re-
sulted in the same decision regarding which law applied, whether it be federal or
72
state. In resolving the decisions for himself, Thomas stated that at least the "ma-
jority's decision [was] limited and narrow," and would amount to nothing more
than a single federal court's use of a state law.73
Justice Thomas was not the only person to have difficulty resolving which
law would apply after Mastrobuono.74 Commentators have remarked that the
holding encourages forum-shopping because of the potential that Thomas was
correct, and that it only applies in the limited circumstance of review of a federal
court's interpretation of a choice-of-law clause. 75 Supreme Court decisions fol-
lowing Mastrobuono have clarified that Volt involved preemption of a state pro-
cedural rule, while Mastrobuono was a decision that preempted New York's sub-
stantive law that limited punitive damages under the Garrity rule.
76
Although federal courts now follow Mastrobuono and leave punitive damages
as a procedural issue under federal law, 77 state courts are not necessarily so quick
to follow suit. Particularly in New York, where many securities' arbitrations take
place, courts continue to ignore Mastrobuono, retaining the Garrity rule and pro-
hibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 78 Somewhere between those
two views, Mastrobuono likely suggests, when it comes to the issue of punitive
damages in arbitration: (1) arbitrators are free, in many situations, to award puni-
tive damages; (2) a state law that purported to preclude punitive awards would
likely be preempted by the FAA if federal law applied to any procedural part of
the arbitration agreement; and (3) parties may, if done explicitly, take punitive
69. Gross, supra note 55, at 15.
70. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995) (Thomas, C., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 66-67. State law would prohibit punitive damages in Mastrobuono, and state law would
have stayed the dispute from even going to arbitration in Volt. Id. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of
Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
73. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52, 71-72 (Thomas, C., dissenting).
74. Gross, supra note 55, at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 75-76 & n.96.
78. Id. at 75. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Trimble, 631 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In
Trimble, the court "[found] Mastrobuono inapplicable and [held] that [the] arbitrator lacked authority
to award punitive damages under the Garrity rule when the arbitration was to take place in New York,
be conducted under AMEX rules, and be governed by New York law." Id. at 75 n.95.
[Vol. I
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damages off the table in their contracts. 79 Additionally, because Mastrobuono was
more directly concerned with the issue of choice-of-law provisions than the more
specific issue of how punitive damages fit into those choices, the case also served
to show that a choice-of-law provision in an arbitration agreement will generally
apply only to state substantive law.80
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., the Eighth Circuit con-
sidered the applicability of a punitive damages waiver in an arbitration agreement
that gave the arbitrator "all powers provided by the law," and then denied, "to the
fullest extent permitted by the law," the power to award punitive damages.8 The
court analyzed the agreement itself in finding, contrary to the district court, that
the award of punitive damages should not be vacated.82
Without question, the Eighth Circuit determined that because the plain lan-
guage of the agreement gave either party the right to "expressly waive any right to
claim [punitive damages] to the fullest extent permitted by law," punitive damages
could be waived "only if governing law permitted such a waiver." 83 Therefore, if
the governing law did not permit a right to waive such damages, as was the case
with Missouri state law, neither party could do so. 84 It was the parties' intent to
apply Missouri law, and Missouri law is well-settled on this issue; future liability
can never be waived "for intentional torts or for gross negligence, or for activities
involving the public interest., 85 Because a waiver of punitive damages is an at-
tempt to "exonerate oneself from future liability," the court discerned that the
parties could not waive future claims against them for punitive damages.
86
The court acknowledged that the parties could have avoided this holding if
the FAA, which allows parties to put terms into their arbitration agreements that
are not otherwise permitted under state law, had been the sole governing authority
87for their agreement. However, the court stated it was clear that Missouri law
applied because the arbitration clause provided for arbitration "to the extent al-
lowed by applicable law," and the "applicable law" was defined later in the
agreement as "the laws of the state" where the Starks' property was located. 88
Therefore, Missouri state substantive law clearly applied to the agreement.89
Unlike Mastrobuono, where the authority of an arbitrator to award punitive dam-
age awards was an issue of procedural law,90 the court in Stark defined the author-
ity to award punitive damages as an issue of substantive law.
91
79. Jia Fei, supra note 31, at 24.
80. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 76-77.
81. Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 797-98 (8th Cir. 2004).
82. Id. at 803.
83. Id. at 800.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. 1996)).
86. Stark, 381 F.3d at 800.
87. Id.
88. Id. The Starks' home was located near Kansas City, Missouri. Id. at 797.
89. Id. at 800.
90. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995).
91. Stark, 381 F.3d at 800.
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The Eighth Circuit also addressed the arbitrator's finding that the agreement
was ambiguous, a finding which the district court considered irrational.92 Because
the agreement was to "operat[e] within the framework of the FAA,, 93 while also
governed by the choice-of-law provision as to waiver of punitive damages, the
court found that "an arbitrator could reasonably conclude [the] agreement [was]
ambiguous" and award punitive damages. 94 Comparing this case to Mastrobuono,
where the Supreme Court agreed that a "choice-of-law clause introduces an ambi-
guity into an arbitration agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages
awards," the court in Stark was further convinced that the arbitrator's finding of
ambiguity was not irrational.95
Lastly, the Eighth Circuit addressed the possibility that the punitive damage
award exhibited "manifest disregard of the law." 96 Because the arbitrator clearly
explained his reasoning for the award, and his reasoning was based on a percent-
age of shareholder equity, the court did not find manifest disregard.97 In conclu-
sion, the court maintained that EMC "got exactly what it bargained for" because it
chose to enter an agreement to arbitrate in order to decide the rules by which it
would be governed, and it should have to abide by such rules.98 As similarly
stated in Mastrobuono, where one party "drafted an ambiguous document... they
cannot [later] claim the benefit of the doubt," and the party who did not select the
language is protected from an "unintended or unfair result." 99
V. COMMENT
A cursory reading of Stark implies that parties, or at least the offending party,
can find relief from liability, even after grievously tortious conduct, by simply
including the right language in the arbitration agreement. °° If only federal law
applies to the agreement, parties can clearly limit punitive damages under the
FAA. If only state law applies, parties can also clearly limit punitive damages, as
seen by the continued use of the Garrity rule in some jurisdictions. However, if
parties wish to apply both state and federal law, their drafting must be exception-
ally clear in defining which law is intended to govern which provisions in the
92. Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2004).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 801.
95. Id. (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62).
96. Id. at 802.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 803.
99. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).
100. See Mellas, supra note 62 (stating that "parties may be able to waive liability for punitive dam-
ages with forethought and careful contractual drafting"); Barfield & Korchin, supra note 39, at 3
(stating that, the court's decision to look directly to the contract in Mastrobuono, "suggests that agree-
ments containing express waivers of the right to claim punitive damages may be upheld, where statu-
tory rights are not implicated"); CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Model ADR Clauses, at
www.cpradr.org/formbook/pdfs/2/arbc.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (describing how to write arbitra-
tion clauses, suggests that "unless punitive damages are explicitly carved out in the arbitration clause,
the arbitrator(s) may be empowered to award such damages"). See also UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer
Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) (asserting that it is not that difficult for parties to ensure
the FAA is applied because the court "will not interpret an arbitration agreement as precluding the
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agreement. In order to clearly prohibit punitive damages, the contract must use
only federal law, which allows for such a waiver, or provide for the use of state
law, where that state actually allows a waiver, which was not the case in Stark.
On the other hand, it is less difficult to ensure that an arbitrator will be given the
authority to award punitive damages, because federal law favors arbitrability, and
all possible remedies that entails.
In essence, the Eighth Circuit based its opinion in Stark on the agreement
language that stated: parties "expressly waive any right to claim [punitive dam-
ages] to the fullest extent permitted by law."' 0 ' Because the court found, without
question, that parties intended Missouri law to apply to the substantive terms of
the agreement, and Missouri law allows no waiver of future liability of punitive
damages, the Starks could receive punitive damages stemming from EMC's con-
duct.10 2 The court further stated that, if only the FAA governed the agreement,
"the punitive damages waiver might have barred any such award."'
10 3
While the Stark court's holding clearly applied the law correctly based on the
contract language and Missouri's limitations on waivers, its implication is trou-
bling, particularly when considered in the context of the facts of the case. Not
only did EMC continue to contact the Starks in violation of the FDCPA, but an
EMC agent also forcibly entered the Starks' home. 104 In front of a judge or jury,
this would surely be compelling evidence for punitive damages. Similarly, if
placed in front of an arbitrator, punitive damages would likely be awarded, except
for the fact that parties may have taken that remedy off the table. Arbitration is
partially intended to allow parties to lay out their potential complaints pre-dispute,
in exchange for the belief that they would be settled quickly, and the parties there-
fore have reasonable expectations as to the outcome.
However, at least in certain contexts, public policy does not favor waiving li-
ability for intentional tortious conduct concluding that it should be outside the
reach of parties' ability to waive, even if done so expressly. In Mastrobuono, the
United States Supreme Court, holding that punitive damages were not foreclosed,
discussed that it appeared "unlikely that petitioners were actually aware of New
York's bifurcated approach105 to punitive damages" or that "by signing a standard-
form contract.., they might be giving up an important substantive right."' 6 This
implies that the Court's holding was not only based on the finding that federal law
applied to the arbitration agreement and also to the parties' situation. Therefore, it
is possible, and perhaps likely, that even if parties expressly waive punitive dam-
ages, the measure could still be awarded by an arbitrator, and upheld by a review-
ing court.




104. Id. at 797.
105. "Bi-furcated approach" refers to New York state law that "the power to award punitive damages
is limited to judicial tribunals and may not be exercised by arbitrators ...." Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53 (1995). See also Gotanda, supra note 29, at 84. Gotanda noted
that the Mastrobuono court was "concerned about unequal bargaining power between the securities
company and private investors [and] had sought to protect investors from abusive practices ..... Id.
106. Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 53.
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Beyond specific examples of when punitive damages seem appropriate, such
as in Stark and Mastrobuono, public policy generally favors awards of punitive
damages in situations where unequal bargaining power exists. °7 Punitive dam-
ages are awarded when a party has acted in a "willful or malicious" manner with
the goal of keeping the injured "from engaging in self-help remedies," and for
"compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses."'10 8
In Willoughby,'° 9 the Eleventh Circuit provided several arguments in favor of
punitive damage awards." 0 First, arbitration is no longer mistrusted, as it had
been historically, thus encouraging courts and parties in arbitration to want to
avoid giving too much leeway to arbitrators."' Second, in practice, it has not
played out that arbitrators, if given the power, abuse their ability to award punitive
damages. 12 Third, arbitrators have usually been allowed to use "broad powers" in
crafting their remedies in order to fit each unique arbitration situation.13 Fourth,
if arbitration is a more cost and time efficient means of settling disputes, then it is
more expeditious to put all claims before an arbitrator, rather than leaving open
the possibility of a later judicial claim for punitive damages." 4 Finally, if the
party who might seek a claim to punitive damages in court does not do so, or is
barred from doing so, then he or she has lost an important substantive right." 1
5
Even if parties follow the suggestion of the Stark court, and explicitly waive
punitive damages as allowed by the governing law, it appears there are at least
three reasons why courts may discount language purporting to waive punitive
damages and give arbitrators the power to award punitive remedies. The first is
found when public policy mandates that it would not be "fair" for the particular
parties to take punitive damages out of the picture. As in Mastrobuono, courts
will look at the facts in order to protect one party from "unintended or unfair re-
sult[s]. ' ' 116 The party who would benefit from a waiver of punitive damages is
often the party that drafted the agreement, giving that party the upper hand; con-
sequently, courts will construe the agreement against that party." 7 This interpre-
tation is supported by the non-statutory reasons for vacatur, which include reversal
if an award is "completely irrational," in "manifest disregard of the law," 118 or
void against public policy. "
9
107. See also Gotanda, supra note 29, at 84.
108. Id. at 63.
109. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima, 776 F.2d 269 (1 th Cir. 1985).
110. See Jia Fei, supra note 3 1, at 30 (providing a summary of the supporting arguments presented in
Willoughby, 776 F.2d 269 (11 th Cir. 1985)).





116. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 84.
117. Barfield & Korchin, supra note 39, at 3 n.24. The Willoughby court even remarked that, if a
party could simply eliminate punitive damages with the right contract language, many more would
attempt to do so. Id.
118. Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2001)).
119. Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476, 488 (5th Cir. 2002). The
Fifth Circuit stated, "We have recently similarly determined that a court may entertain a challenge to
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Second, there are particular types of disputes where courts have consistently
been disinclined to prohibit punitive damages. One such area is in arbitrations
involving employment disputes. 120 For example, the Eleventh Circuit voided an
arbitration clause that gave the arbitrator power to only award compensatory dam-
ages, stating that it denied the employee "the possibility of meaningful relief in an
arbitration proceeding.'' In addition to employment disputes, securities agree-
ments involving the potential waiver of punitive damages, such as in Mastro-
buono, are particularly troublesome. 22 When an investor contracts with a broker-
age firm, he or she is at an obvious disadvantage in knowing about securities, the
intangibility of securities leaves them "susceptible to abuse," and brokers almost
always work on commission, leaving them dependent on the investor to continue
buying. 123 These characteristics leave the securities industry particularly open for
"fraud and breaches of fiduciary duty,"'' 24 and explain why securities firms make it
a point to arbitrate most of their disputes in New York under the Garrity rule.
Certainly securities firms are not the only commercial entities engaged in poten-
tially "unscrupulous and malicious conduct," 125 and one can easily imagine other
settings in which it would be unjust to completely take away the possibility of
punitive damages for an injured claimant.
A third reason a court might not interpret language that was intended to pro-
hibit punitive damages is the disagreement over whether the authority to award
punitive damages is an issue of procedure or substance. In Stark, the court stated
that Missouri law clearly applied to the substantive terms of the agreement. 126 In
Mastrobuono, state law was applied to "substantive principles," but whether or
not the arbitrator has the authority to award punitive damages was an issue of
procedure. 27 Even if a contract is drafted with specificity so as to apply state law
to certain provisions, and federal law to others, a drafter must also forecast
whether the state court, or the federal court applying state law, will consider the
authority to award punitive damages an issue of substance or procedure.
It appears Justice Thomas' contention that Mastrobuono was a narrow hold-
ing was enlightening, although for reasons other than he stated.1 28 He believed
that more parties would be successful in limiting their damages and avoiding Mas-
trobuono's holding, but in cases like Stark, it has been the opposite. Stark and
Mastrobuono imply that clear language in the arbitration agreement would effec-
tuate a limitation on punitive damages. However, parties continue to be exposed
to liability because they have not tweaked the language quite enough, or been
careful in using the appropriate governing law. This is further stymied by a vari-
120. Barfield & Korchin, supra note 39, at n.3. The authors cite Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs.,
Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th Cir. 1998), wherein the Eleventh Circuit found that Title VII prohibits
limiting an arbitrator to only compensatory damages because it "denies the employee the possibility of
meaningful relief in an arbitration proceeding." Id. at 3 n.23.
121. Id. (quoting Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062).
122. Gotanda, supra note 29, at 85.
123. Id. at 85-86.
124. Id. at 86 (quoting Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of
Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK L. REV. 1095, 1096 (1993)).
125. Id.
126. Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2004).
127. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 64 (1995).
128. Id. at 72-73 (Thomas, C., dissenting).
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ety of mechanisms courts will use to ensure that awards are fair and appropriate to
the circumstances, such as in Stark, where the Eighth Circuit considered limita-
tions on damages to be a substantive, rather than a procedural issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although it appears Stark implies that parties can easily limit their liability
with appropriate waiver clauses and choice-of-law provisions, it is possible courts
will continue to find the means-whether based on public policy, or based on
requirements for even more specific provisions-to uphold arbitral awards giving
punitive damages. While this protects the "little guy" from losing the right to
potentially viable claims for punitive damages, it also holds the potential to make
it more difficult for two parties approaching a dispute on equal footing to be as-
sured they will get exactly what they bargained for in arbitration. Even so, parties
skilled in drafting will most likely find appropriate language and choice-of-law
provisions to contract their preferred terms, or choose to apply only federal law,





Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss1/10
